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Abstract   This paper focuses on fisheries management systems as a motivation
factor for market-oriented value adding (MOVA). Analytically, the paper relies
on the marketing and industrial economics literature. It shows how established
fisheries management systems reduce motivation for market-oriented value add-
ing (MOVA) and thereby waste resource rent. An improved management model
is introduced which motivates MOVA, cost-efficiency, sustainability, and fair so-
cial allocation. This model combines a Seasonal Quota Auction (SQA) and
administrative allocation of licenses and quotas to communities or fisher
groups. This model offers the following advantages in comparison with a pure
Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) model: (i) increases resource rent without
privatizing the fish resources to a few private holders; (ii) leases seasonal quo-
tas instead of selling permanent quotas as with ITQ; (iii) improves rent
generation by motivating the most market-oriented and efficient fishers by leas-
ing quotas on credit; and (iv) offers the choice of collecting resource rent
through fisher’s cooperatives, regions, ITQ owners, government, or redistribu-
tion of rent as a bonus to all fishers.
Key words   Fish auctions, fisheries management, fisheries marketing, institu-
tional economics, market orientation, resource rent, sustainable development,
value adding.
Introduction
The resource rent in fisheries is the profit margin between market value and the
costs related to catching, processing, and sales of catch. Market value increases with
increasing shortage of supply relative to total demand. Total demand, however, is a
sum of the demand in market segments with different demand profiles. Individually,
fishermen experience that the market values of landings are related to how well the
product mixes from catches match demand in the receiving market segments. There-
fore, market values and economic rents from fish catches vary significantly between
groups of vessels. Product mix from catching derives from the mix of fish species,
fish size, product quality, degree of processing, and fish by-product utilization (roe,
liver, etc.) (Sylvia 1994). Maximizing market values is, according to standard mar-
keting theory, dependent of the fish business’ basic ability to strategically manage
the product mix from catch and timing of sales to the relative best market segments.
Market values can further be improved by marketing activities, such as collection
and strategic use of market information and building customer relationships that
strengthen the transactions between seller and buyers.
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Generally, the marketing management literature gives strong empirical evidence
that both market-oriented management and market orientation have significant posi-
tive effects on market performance, which is positively related to financial and busi-
ness performance (Becker and Homburg 1999; Deshpanté, Farleyand, and Webster
1993; Jaworski and Kohli 1993; Narver and Slater 1990; Ruekert 1992). Market ori-
entation is conceptualized as an organizational behavior which performs “organiza-
tion-wide generation, dissemination, and responsiveness to market intelligence”
(Kohli and Jaworski 1990), and as “an organizational culture (…) that most effec-
tively and efficiently creates the necessary behavior for the creation of superior
value for buyers” (Narver and Slater 1990). Capturing added values in the market
through differentiation and market orientation is all about long-term business learn-
ing (Narver, Slater, and Tietje 1998). The need for organizational learning is a bar-
rier to change because it takes time and energy and is costly (Rogers 1983). So what
motivates business and their employers to invest time and money in long-term, mar-
ket-oriented activities? More specifically, how can motivation be influenced for
maximizing market values through long-term market orientation in the fishing busi-
ness? This question will be discussed using an analytical perspective from industrial
organization and the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) model (see figure 1)
(Scherer 1980; Porter 1981).
Performance refers to resource rent related to market-oriented value adding and
cost efficiency. Conduct refers to the fish industry strategies where objectives, time
slack, raw material control, and business capabilities (resources such as expertise,
equipment, capital, and vertical control) are the main constraints. Capital and verti-
cal control may accumulate through performance. Structure refers to mobility (entry
and exit) barriers in strategic fishery groups (e.g., factory trawlers, longliners, etc.)
(Barney 1996). Fishery structure is a function of business conduct, but government
policy plays an important role in the structure formation (Porter 1990). Fisheries
management controls the main raw material source in the seafood value chain and is
a main constraint for operating fishing firms and for resource rent generation
(Trondsen and Johnston 1998). Over time, the objectives of fisheries management
have progressed from maintaining sustainable fish stocks, to allocating fishing
rights to preferred fisher groups, and recently, to improving profitability through
cost efficiency. So far, less attention had been paid to the objective of maximizing
market value of the total catch.
Figure 1. Analytical PerspectiveMarket-oriented Value Adding 19
Market Value and Resource Rent
The main focus in academic research and fisheries politics has been on the catching
cost side of the resource rent equation. Less attention has been focused on variation
in market-oriented value adding. Introduction of ITQs in the New Zealand ground-
fish fishery and in the US and Canadian halibut fisheries has demonstrated, how-
ever, that changes in the fisheries management system also influence market-ori-
ented value adding in the fleet (Dewees 1989; Herrmann 1996; Sjøholdt 1997).
This asymmetric focus is understandable due to the ability of individual compa-
nies in the short-run to maximize profits by overexploitation the fish stocks; i.e.,
harvesting more than a sustainable long-term biological reproduction. Such profit
maximizing can, in business terms, be characterized as making profit by using the
production machinery as raw material (here the fish stock) rather than relying on
maximizing the long-term market value of the annual biological production. This
potential for high, short-run profit in open fisheries has given strong incentives for
individual entrepreneurs to increase their harvest capacity and catch, even though
total catch exceeds the long-term sustainable catch level (MSY), a process described
as the “tragedy of the commons” (Gordon 1954; Hardin 1968).
Fishery economists have proposed different cost-oriented solutions to the prob-
lem of resource rent depletion. Most solutions prescribe limitation of fishing entry,
regulation of effort, or allocation of individual quotas (Clark and Munro 1975; Scott
and Neher 1981). Other economists argue for governmental auction of limited num-
ber of licenses among the participants (Butlin 1982; De Voretz and Schwindt 1985).
Stronger national control over the allocation is also advocated (Neher, Arnarson, and
Mollett 1989). More recently, significant support has been given to the idea of
privatization of the common resource using ITQs and individual transferable li-
censes (ITL) (Clark, Major, and Mollett 1988; Hanneson 1990; Helgason 1991;
Kennedy 1991; Boyd and Dewees 1991; Grafton 1995). However, academic econo-
mists seldom take into account the political constraints and the social costs of the
solutions (Copes 1986a; Copes 1986b; McKay and Creed 1990; Lipnowski 1991;
Aquilera 1991). Fisheries managers experience these realities when they receive
contradictory and heterogeneous demands from specialized advisers and interest
groups like biologists, environmentalists, economists, fisher groups, and local fish-
ing communities (Davits 1991; Sissenwine and Mace 1992; Eythorsson 1996;
Charles 1998a). For an overview of these issues, see National Research Council
(1999).
Fish Industry Strategies and Fisheries Management
The literature about how fisheries management influences the fishers’ market-ori-
ented value adding is very slim, except for a growing literature concerning the
value-added advantages in utilization of market information for fisheries manage-
ment (e.g., Larkin and Sylvia 1999; Carpo 2000; Martinez-Garmendia, Anderson,
and Carroll 2000).
In contrast, the relationship between business capabilities, as raw material, and
business strategies analyses is well documented in the general management litera-
ture. The market-orientation literature acknowledges that the levels of existing capa-
bilities may limit the companies’ ability to be market-oriented (e.g., Narver and
Slater 1990).
The seafood business’ ability to satisfy market demand is dependent on its ac-
cess to the raw fish catch in terms of the right quantity, quality, and time (Anderson
1995; Larkin and Sylvia 1995, 1999; Carroll, Anderson, and Martinez-GarmendiaTrondsen 20
1999; Trondsen and Johnston 1998). Fish prices are very elastic and vary a lot over
the year depending on supply pressure in the available value chains (Trondsen 1994,
1997). Supply management of demanded fish products rather than “catch driven
sales” is, therefore, a key factor for maximizing market values.
Still, nature has a significant influence on the supply pressure from fish catch.
Fishers traditionally want to catch when the fish is available and when the catching
costs are lowest. The fishing companies’ access to the fish is, however, controlled by
governments. If the natural resource policy governing access to the resource is
solely based on conservation, it is expected to limit the ability of the fishing indus-
try to be market-oriented and may lead to market structures that stifle market orien-
tation for these industries (Trondsen and Johnston 1998).
In this paper, the relationship between market value and fisheries management
will be discussed in light of the experience of different management systems prac-
ticed under different political settings. Information sources include both the litera-
ture as well as the author’s long-time fisheries experience. The purpose of the study
is to generate hypotheses for further discussion and testing. The analysis will be or-
ganized as follows. First, I discuss how different fisheries management systems—
Olympic style, licenses, and transferable quotas and licenses—influence the motiva-
tion of MOVA and, thus, resource rent generation. Based on this analysis, a seasonal
quota auction system is outlined as an alternative motivation mechanism for increas-
ing MOVA. The discussion of each management system’s impact on MOVA is con-
cluded in general propositions.
Market Orientation and Fisheries Management Systems
Olympic Style
Olympic-style catch management gives the participants (with or without licenses)
the right to catch until a specified total fish quota is taken. This has been practiced
in such disparate fisheries as the pollock fishery in the North Pacific (until 1999),
the offshore Japanese tuna fishery, and part of the Norwegian coastal fishery. The
total quota (TAC) or shares of TAC are allocated to all that are interested in catch-
ing, or limited to qualified individual applicants among a chosen target fishing
group. Examples of such target groups are vessels that are expected to sell their
catch in specific regions as in Northern Norway, licensed offshore factory trawlers,
or onshore catchers in the US Alaska pollock and Oregon hake fisheries (prior to the
introduction of cooperatives in 1999), vessels less than 32 feet in Alaska’s Bristol
Bay salmon fishery, and licensed coastal vessels or fresh fish trawlers in the Norwe-
gian saithe fisheries.
Olympic-style management without entry limitation controls the total catch, but
also encourages competition between the participants in order for them to secure
their individual shares of the group’s TAC. The competition pattern tends to focus
on catching as quickly as possible. When the total quota is less than the vessels’
catch capacity, the most efficient vessels will catch the highest share of the total
quota and earn the best margins. Over time, the total fishing time available for har-
vesting quota tends to become shorter and shorter due to entry of new participants
and increased individual efficiency.
This was, for example, the case for the US Pacific pollock fisheries, where the sea-
son length declined to only a couple of months every year, and for the halibut fishery in
Canada and in the US (see figure 2) (Casey et al. 1995). An extreme case was the Alaska
halibut fishery, in which the season length declined to just two, 24-hour openings
during the 1980s when it was managed under an Olympic system (Sjøholt 1997).Market-oriented Value Adding 21
In order to maximize the individual vessel quota share under the Olympic man-
agement system, the participants are motivated to invest in capacity-increasing
equipment, rather than in market value-adding activities. The chosen fish processing
lines are those that generate the best daily total margins, even if other processing
lines would have given higher margins per ton if time weren’t a limiting factor. For
example, the pollock factory trawlers under the Olympic system tended to process
more surimi than fillets even in market situations where margins per ton of catch
were higher in processing fillets compared to surimi. The reason was that a greater
quantity of raw fish could be turned into surimi per day. A comparison of Alaska
pollock offshore; onboard processing between the Japanese factory vessels, which
operated in Alaska waters until the 1980’s, and US factory vessels in the 1980s and
90s shows this difference in behavior. The Japanese had enough quotas for most of
the year and could focus more on surimi quality and marketing. In contrast, when
the US factory trawlers were managed under an Olympic-style system, they were in-
vested heavily to improve daily output in each vessel. The US trawlers had to com-
pete for a limited total quota during a short time period and had to focus on daily
processing efficiency to maximize their share of the total quota (Arnarson and
Trondsen 1989).
Profitable market-oriented value adding meets significant barriers under an
Olympic management system where vessels operate for only a few months under
fierce time constraints. Processing for the higher-valued fresh fish markets requires
a more continuous raw fish supply and time limits on fishing trips to secure fish
quality, due to the limited shelflife for fresh, iced fish. Some traditional fresh fish
consumer markets are seasonal and adapted to seasonal catch, but the growth in
fresh fish sales is increasingly related to supermarkets and restaurant chains de-
manding stable supply every week over the year (as demonstrated by the exceptional
market growth of fresh, farmed salmon). In practice, storing fresh fish is only pos-
sible in live condition to maintain the freshness preferred by consumers. Prices are
driven downward in cases where the quantity of catches and landings of fresh fish
under Olympic-style management exceeds the weekly capacity and premium quality
demand in the fresh fish distribution system. In such cases, lower-priced frozen,
Figure 2. Season Length of Olympic Fisheries after Alaskan
Pollock 1993–1998. US Offshore fleet in the Bering SeaTrondsen 22
salted, canned, or other quality-preserved products become more profitable.1 When
the total quota for a species is caught, the supply of the fresh product declines and the
fresh fish price may increase again—but fishers are not allowed to catch fish to meet
this demand. This is why the total resource rent may increase when individual vessels
are free to choose when to catch limited individual vessel quotas to take advantage of
market conditions, as demonstrated in the Pacific halibut fisheries (Hermann 1996).
It is also much more time consuming to produce value-added products on board
the vessels (as fillets/steaks, etc.) or to utilize byproducts from fish (roe, liver, head,
enzymes, amino acids, fish meal, Omega-3 oil, etc.). This means that even if it is
possible to increase the market value of the catch through value-adding production,
the time constraint under the Olympic quota system will hinder such practice.
The conclusion is that Olympic-style fisheries management of TAC, or a share
of TAC, allocated to a group of vessels will waste resource rent on both the income
and the cost sides, even if it is successful in securing a sustainable fish stock. The
utilization of possible market values from a limited total quota will be reduced if the
time constraint reduces the industry’s motivation to be market oriented. While entry
restrictions may reduce resource rent waste on the cost side, they will not motivate
market orientation. Thus, a generalization of this proposition is:
GENERAL PROPOSITION 1: Fisheries managed after an Olympic-style catching re-
duces the time available for market-oriented value adding and, thus, reduces poten-
tial resource rent.
License Management
Introducing licenses for entry into specific fisheries is another method of regulating
the total catch capacity by limiting the number of participants in a fishery.2 When
quotas are allocated to license owners, license allocation indirectly becomes an allo-
cation of future harvest and resource rent between the participants.
If the license system reduces entry of new vessels and stimulates exit of existing
vessels, the resource rent increases, according to economic theory, by reducing
catching costs until the number of vessels has an optimum catch capacity for the to-
tal available quota.
Norway is an example where the fishing effort in many coastal fisheries has
been regulated through a combination of TAC, entry licenses, and individual vessel
quotas. The combination of these regulatory tools may vary from fishery to fishery.
Fishing vessels may, for example, have both a general license to a specific fishery
(e.g., groundfish or herring) and an individual quota of specific species, such as cod
haddock, herring, mackerel, etc. Fisheries requiring special licenses represented
more than half of all Norwegian catch, by value, in the late 1980s. Licenses were
required for 90% of the herring sector (herring, mackerel, capelin, and blue whiting)
and 35% of the groundfish sector (Trondsen and Angel 1992).
Since individual quota limitation was introduced in 1990 on smaller coastal ves-
sels with conventional gears (net, longline, etc.), the coastal sector has been gradu-
ally closing for new entrants. Today, fisheries managed under licenses and/or indi-
vidual quotas account for almost the entire value of the Norwegian fishing industry
(Holm, Rånes, and Hersoug 1998).
1 In some cases, processed fish receive a higher price than fresh fish. This is often the case for big salted
cod for Bacalao products demanded by Catholics in southern Europe and Brazil.
2 Licenses can be non-transferable or transferable between vessels.Market-oriented Value Adding 23
Introduction of licenses when the capacity is already too high may hinder new
entry, and also reduction of capacity. It may even increase capacity because vessels
may enter the fishery in anticipation of the introduction of licenses because of the
license’s potential market value.
The fishers’ incomes are decided by the vessels’ share of the total resource rent
in each fishery, which varies from species to species due to substantial fluctuations
in catch and commodity prices. For example, the resource rent can be high for her-
ring in some years and low for prawns and cod. While for other years, the situation
may be reversed.
Fishers learn fast that to secure a high-income under changing price and catch
conditions in different seasons and fisheries, they have to secure all necessary rights
(licenses) in order to have the option to choose the most profitable combination of
fishing seasons each year. When licenses were first introduced, the Norwegian gov-
ernment required that vessels already have a catch record to be eligible for one.
Similar methods were used when licenses were introduced in the US Alaska pollock
and Icelandic cod fisheries. To keep the license over time, the Norwegian govern-
ment also requires that catching activity be continuously documented.
When catch records for each seasonal fishery are a condition for maintaining li-
cense rights, the fishers are motivated to keep a fleet consisting of all-round vessels
which are suitable for using many different gears and for processing and storing dif-
ferent species onboard. These vessels that combine many short seasonal fisheries are
motivated to maximize their yearly income by catching as much as possible in seasons
under Olympic time constraints and catching as fast as possible in seasons under in-
dividual limited quota constraints. The time to take care of and process the catch
will, in both cases, be reduced. Market-oriented activities, such as quality manage-
ment, value-adding packing, sorting, processing, and just-in-time delivery suffer.
In the Norwegian case, the size of the individual vessel quota has also been a
function of the vessel size. Under such regulation, the fishers are motivated to in-
crease the size of the vessel in order to increase the present and future shares of the
total quotas. To avoid increasing vessel sizes and fleet capacity, governments usu-
ally put vessel size constraints on the catch licenses. When quota is a main asset in
the fisheries, boat owners are motivated to build or purchase second-hand vessels
according to these license and quota requirements rather than to maximize the mar-
ket value of the catch through better handling and processing onboard.
This means that under such license qualifying activity and technical license con-
straints, fishing effort is expected to increase without increasing the catch value, while
market value-adding activities decrease. A generalization of this proposition is:
GENERAL PROPOSITION II: Fisheries managed by limited-entry licenses may re-
duce the resource rent if: (i) Catch records are required to maintain licenses, which
motivates catching to maintain fishing rights in temporarily less-profitable fisheries
and reduces the available time for market-oriented value adding; and (ii) Vessel size
constraints are imposed, which reduce the optimal mix of products processed from
catch.
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) and Individual Transferable Licenses
(ITLs)
Most economists consider ITQs as the most economically efficient system in fisher-
ies management. This system has been adopted in Iceland, New Zealand, Australia,
Canada, and the US (halibut and sablefish fisheries), among other places. Experi-Trondsen 24
ence has shown that the system basically works according to theory when it comes
to improve cost efficiency and more market-oriented value adding based on tradi-
tional production methods (National Research Council 1999). The capacity used in
the fisheries adapts to the income from the available ITQs. The most efficient and
financially strong entrepreneurs and vessel owners buy quotas from the less efficient
quota owners (Arnarson 1991; Lindner, Campbell, and Bevin 1992). Iceland, for ex-
ample, has no specific size or gear regulation on vessels, except biologically moti-
vated mesh size in trawl nets, and quota allocation to smaller coastal vessels. The
fleet structure has, therefore, adapted to vessel sizes and catching technology that
the fishers perceive as most efficient for their business, without interference from
the government. Ownership constraints may reduce this effect. Matthiasson (1997)
has shown that local government ownership and employment interests in the Icelan-
dic fresh fish trawler fleet have hindered the capacity reduction favored by fisheries
managers.
In Iceland, all quota transactions are handled by the Icelandic Directorate of
Fisheries to assure that the quota transactions occur at a real fish market price be-
tween anonymous partners. Earlier quotas were traded between business partners
and priced accordingly to broader business interests, which tended to increase the
quota price far beyond its fish market value.3
Norway has a system with transferable licenses connected to vessel transactions
controlled by the government. Each licensed vessel has the right to catch a share of
a total quota either through competition in Olympic-regulated fisheries or as a gov-
ernment allocated individual share of a TAC. The Norwegian government had pro-
grams during the 1990s to reduce capacity and effort through decommissioning
schemes, support for selling vessels abroad, support for establishing international
fishing, and offers of increased vessel quotas when two or more licenses were used
by one vessel.
The first three programs failed because the compensation was too low compared
to the loss of permanent license rights. Most vessel owners gave priority to main-
taining future fishing rights instead of selling the license back to the government.
When the government introduced quota incentives for adding more than one li-
cense to each vessel, the market started to work. Under this scheme, fishers who
owned two or more licensed vessels, which had individual quota rights, were al-
lowed to transfer a certain percentage of the quota from one vessel to another vessel
if the latter vessel was withdrawn from the fisheries. The prices of vessels with li-
censes and quota rights went up to a very profitable level, which motivated the own-
ers to sell vessels with the license to another vessel owner that wanted to catch more
on his/her present vessel. Through this process, first introduced in the Norwegian
pelagic sector and in the groundfish fisheries in the late 1990s, capacity and total
catching costs have been substantially reduced. Norway did, in practice, introduce
an ITL controlled by the government. This is indirectly a transferable quota system
because quotas are allocated to licensed vessels. The government denies that buying
and selling licenses and quotas is allowed, and claims that there is no automatic li-
cense transfer between buyers and sellers of vessels. The government has to issue
the license, which follows the exchange of a vessel title. However, when such a
3 In Iceland, it has been common practice that the quota owners exchange quotas in barter trades. How-
ever, both partners are interested in pricing their quota units as high as possible in order to show high
asset values in their books for financing and equity purposes. Quota assets have also been subject to de-
preciation. Depreciation of high quota values is, therefore, an efficient way to eliminate high taxable in-
come while the quota prices increased far above any reasonable economic level. It is anticipated that the
quota prices will decline to a reasonable level when companies are forced to complete the quota transac-
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transaction is very seldom denied, and there is always more than one buyer per li-
censed vessels, the seller can always choose among those who are approved by the
government. Therefore, both the value of the vessel, plus the value of the license
and related future quota rights, are reflected in the traded vessel price (Flaaten,
Heen, and Salvanes 1995).
The Norwegian experience shows that such a transferable license system related
to a market price is an effective system for adjusting capacity in the fleet. The li-
cense becomes a valued equity asset. Fishers with licenses are protected from com-
petitive pressure from entering competitors (Barney 1996). This means that they
have secured their equity asset by performing their traditional catch- and produc-
tion-oriented behavior. Only fishers with historical records in the industry get a li-
cense in the Norwegian case. The core capabilities in the industry are then limited to
the traditional fishing knowledge, ideas, and behavior. Introduction of new market-
oriented ideas, initiatives, and technologies is often related to the entry of new and
motivated entrepreneurs with alternative core competencies (Porter 1990). Without
available new licenses for more market-oriented entrepreneurs, the license system
may hinder market-oriented value adding in the industry as a whole.
However, those in the ITQ and ITL systems, who received the quota right for
free (based on historical records) when the systems were established, receive all the
resource rent when they sell the quota to the first buyer (Eythorsson 1996). These
rents, which are windfall profits, are then capitalized through high markups on ves-
sels or quota sales. Quota or license values fluctuate due to changes in catch quanti-
ties and fish prices. Such fluctuations provide opportunities for profitable specula-
tion in buying and selling vessels with license rights. It is expected that the objec-
tive and motivation of the business is profit satisfaction rather than profit maximiza-
tion (Simon 1958). Business practices change slowly, constrained by their capabili-
ties and motivation. Industry leaders typically search for solutions for business
problems in the neighborhood of established business practices, where marginal
profit satisfaction may be reached with the lowest resource effort (Cyert and March
1963). The possibility for resource rent capitalization in the form of windfall profit
is, therefore, expected to reduce the motivation for investment in technology and
structures focusing more on long-term value adding. The latter may require changes
in the fish business’ market-oriented practice beyond better market utilization of tra-
ditional technology and practice. A disadvantage of both the ITL and ITQ systems is
the reduced entrepreneurial motivation for increased market-oriented value adding.
Both systems can secure a high resource rent from harvesting, regardless of the con-
tribution from market-oriented value adding.
There is a lot of evidence that new business orientation, in general, comes from
entering new ventures and from entrepreneurs driven by external knowledge, ideas,
and social forces (Drucker 1986; Porter 1990; Trondsen 1985).
Openness for new entrepreneurs is an advantage of the open transferable license
or quota systems. When the resource rent is fully capitalized through traditional
products, capital-controlling entrepreneurs may still purchase or rent quotas and li-
censes and introduce market-oriented ideas (Barney 1986). However, the cost of en-
try is much higher than for the fishers that initially got the fishing right for free. The
need for capital becomes a new entry barrier and favors companies that control or
have access to enough capital, and excludes those entrepreneurs who don’t. Market-
oriented value adding in the long term is motivated and improved by low barriers
for entering entrepreneurs (Drucker 1986; Porter 1990; Trondsen 1985). Barriers in
the form of non-transferable licenses or high-capitalized licenses and quotas hinder
such entering entrepreneurial pressure in the fishing industry.
Introducing exit mechanisms through transferable quotas and licenses reduces
capacity costs per unit catch and increases resource rent. However, accumulation ofTrondsen 26
assets in private hands increases the monopoly power and economic satisfaction
among the present participants without being market oriented. This reduces the mo-
tivation for more market-oriented value adding if entry of new entrepreneurs is also
restricted by licenses requiring historic participation or high capital costs.
GENERAL PROPOSITION III: Fisheries that require licenses and individual quotas
are motivated to reduce market-oriented value adding if: (i) Historical catch records
and increasing capital are required from the participants; (ii) Entry barriers for new
fishers increase; and (iii) The size of the quota-shares satisfies the existing partici-
pants profit expectation without market-oriented value adding.
Market Orientation Through Fish Auctions
Fish auctions have a great potential to allocate and exchange values where the de-
mand and supply are very diversified (Kearny 1997). Fish auctions have been uti-
lized as the main instrument to exchange multi-species landings of fresh fish be-
tween fishers and firsthand buyers in most European countries. The experiences
from these auctions show that fishers gain higher prices compared to all other ex-
change systems if the catch attributes and/or purchase preferences are heterogeneous
(Arnarson and Trondsen 1998). Auctions that offer catch from many vessels give
heterogeneous buyers the opportunity to purchase their preferred part of the land-
ings (for example one species of a specific size and quality) from several catching
vessels. The buyers then have the opportunity to specialize in products and markets.
Using such strategic, specialized expertise may improve the market-oriented margin
(Porter 1985).
An alternative to auctions is contracts (short or long term) directly between in-
dividual vessels and the first-hand buyer, as is practiced in the Norwegian cod fish-
ery. Buyers under such contracts are obliged to purchase the entire catch containing
a broad range of heterogeneous product attributes. The product attributes in the
catch that do not fit the purchasers’ specialization profile will, in such cases, be in
less demand compared to product attributes which do. Such contracts between sell-
ers of catch containing heterogeneous product attributes and specialized buyers re-
duce the possibility for product specialization and market-oriented value adding in
this transaction, compared with exchange through auctions where heterogeneous
buyers are present. This hypothesis is confirmed by findings from Icelandic fish
auctions, which indicate that the average prices paid for catches under contracts are
significantly lower than prices for fish traded through auctions (Arnarson and
Trondsen 1998). It is also a trend in Iceland that buyers who control catchers under
long-term contracts sell parts of the catch that do not fit their own specialized pro-
duction in the auction. This means that the first-hand buyer collects the margin that
the fishers would otherwise collect if they sold directly through the auction (ibid).
Fish auctions, to date, have not been utilized to exchange fish quotas because
the owners (governments) allocate quotas according to non-monetary rules. Fish
quotas have heterogeneous product attributes, which have different values (product
prices and cost of catching), for different fishing groups. The values vary with quota
attributes, such as species, quantity, fish size, season, catching area, catch gear, days
at sea, allowed bycatch, closed fishing area, spawning ground regulations, etc. The
fishers will have different preferences and will put different values on quota at-
tributes depending of their capability with respect to vessel type, fishing gear, home
location, season combinations, catching, processing, and marketing. If the quota’s
attributes are exchanged through auctions, the fisher’s possible number of attribute
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the fisher’s preferences and the vessel’s capabilities. Such increased choices may im-
prove the opportunity window for specialization of catch, processing, and market orien-
tation. Without governmental constraints on what type of vessels the fishers are allowed
to use, they are motivated to chose the mix of products, markets, species, processing
technology, and capacity that satisfies their rent expectation from a given quota.
Exchange of quotas in auctions will create a price—actually a resource rent—
that fishers are willing to pay the owner and still be able to run a profitable catching
and processing operation for themselves. Competition for quotas among fishers also
gives an incentive to increase operation margins between costs and market values.
This will motivate all participants to improve the value added of the limited total
quota, which, in turn, may increase the resource rent. The resource rent might be
collected by the owner through these kinds of auction sales (government) or by the
fishing community itself.
Auction of quotas is not a new idea. Butlin (1982) and DeVoretz and Schwindt
(1985) argued that auctioning of licenses, combined with free quota rights, is, in
fact, the same as auctioning of quotas. Morgan (1995) and Brubaker (1995) also ar-
gued for quota auctions as a means to solve the problems of current practices of al-
location by administrative decisions, which has been a source of great discontent in
the introduction of ITQ management systems. The only known example of fish
quota auctions is for geoduck in Washington state in the US (Brubaker 1995). Prac-
tical experiences have been gained in other industries, such as communication, air-
line, financial, forest, and mineral, which face the same allocation problems. Auc-
tions that have evolved in other industries have led to the achievement of a wide
range of public policy objectives in an economically efficient manner (Brubaker
1995; Gulley and McGill 1984).
However, if the auction mechanism is utilized without constraints, the sum of
social costs soon may be higher than that which is politically accepted (Charles
1998b). A main disadvantage of the free-market auction solution is that relative mo-
nopoly control of capital, processing, and distribution chains tends to be more im-
portant for the allocation of quotas than a firm’s ability to maximize market-oriented
values from the limited TAC. The market role of governments, as Smith (1993) ar-
gued, is to set rules which hinder monopoly power and increase competition to gain
the advantages of the free-market mechanism. Most governments also have social
objectives for the allocation of fishing rights. The question is, therefore, to what de-
gree can the auction mechanism be integrated into a broader allocation management
decision model that satisfies both the objectives of market orientation and social al-
location, as well as the objective of economic efficiency. A generalization of this
proposition is:
GENERAL PROPOSITION IV: Fisheries are motivated to maximize market-oriented
value adding through fish auctions where heterogeneous product attributes are ex-
changed with heterogeneous buyers’ preferences. The social costs may increase and
market values may be reduced if increased capital requirement and vertical control
in the value chain restrict entry into the business.
Seasonal Quota Auctions (SQAs)
Auction of seasonal quotas offers an institutional solution for the problem of con-
centration of market power in free market solutions (Proposition IV). Seasonal
quota units (SQUs) are assets that can be traded through a seasonal quota auction
(SQA). Such quota units may be for a limited time period and constrained by catch
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The better the SQUs are designed to meet the fishers’ preferences, the higher the
values of the SQUs as reflected in auction prices. The concept of seasonal quota
units may fit into the fishers’ planning horizons. High uncertainties characterize
fisheries and make the fishing industry a high-risk business. Fishers’ planning hori-
zons, therefore, tend to be short term. A seasonal SQA system will, in the same way
as an ITQ system, give fishing enterprises the necessary motivation to be competi-
tive within this regulatory framework. To be competitive bidders in the quota auc-
tion, fishers must keep the margin between operational costs and sales income as
high as possible. It is in the fishers’ interest to minimize their economic overcapac-
ity, adapt to changing business cycles in different fisheries, be market oriented, and
maximize market value.
Three types of problems must be addressed before the auction can work accord-
ing to these objectives: (1) avoid concentration of buying power; (2) allocate quota
to meet demand from different target groups and between seasons; and (3) manage
an efficient exchange process.
Concentration of Buying Power
A seasonal quota auction may, as with tradable ITQ systems, be an arena for power-
ful buyers with “deep pockets” (Porter 1980). These buyers, who control capital,
may be willing to pay a high quota price without making profit for a shorter period
in order to get rid of competitors and reduce future competition. Such strategic con-
duct and structure may also, as suggested in Proposition IV, reduce the probability
for maximization of market-oriented value gain, especially in small auctions with a
limited number of bidders. If the fishers are given credit for the payment of the
SQUs until after the quota is actually caught and sold, such market behavior might
be minimized. Those who are not able to catch the purchased quota may pay only
for the quota they have actually caught, while the rest of the quota may go back to
the auction for resale. However, this mechanism could motivate fishers to buy more
quotas than they need in order to make sure that they have enough if the catch rates
are high. The management task is to make sure that actual total catches match the
available quotas. This can be secured by establishing a mechanism where the fishers
must pay for some part of the quota when the quota is purchased on the auction and
some part after the fish is caught. This will motivate the fishers to sell back to the
auction the part of the quota they have bought but are not able to catch. By running
the quota auction regularly and offering to buy back unused quota units for resale in
Table 1
Example of a Seasonal Quota Unit (SQU) with Catch Constraint Attributes
Attributes Example of Constraints
Fish species Cod
Period Jan. 1 – March 31
Quantity 800 tons
Fish sizes > 2 kg
Bycatch Maximum 100 tons haddock and 50 tons redfish
Catching area N 65˚ – N 70˚, outside 4 nautical miles
Gear Longline
Landings places Northern Norway
License Home address northern Norway (2A)Market-oriented Value Adding 29
the current season, it is expected that the total catch will match the total quota. All
quota units will be allocated to fishers at all times. How to adapt the catch to the
quota will be up to fishers, and may vary based on the catch experience during the
season. In this kind of system, the fisher faces a risk of loss if he buys more quota
units than he can catch and realizes this fact too late for selling the surplus quota
back to the auction for resale to other fishers for the same season.
Target Groups and Seasons
If fishery management has a policy of allocating quotas between seasons and target
fishing groups, an alternative is to follow the international practice of allocating the
total yearly TAC into SGQs. These SGQs may then be divided into SQUs and sold
by auction, as illustrated in table 2.
For example, shares of the TAC in both the US and EU are first allocated to re-
gions, before being shared and allocated to individual vessels. In the US, quotas are
allocated by regional fishery management councils, which set the rules for distribu-
tion of quotas to individual vessels. For example, in the pollock fishery the TAC is
first allocated between offshore factory trawlers, catchers/motherships and catchers/
land processors, and regions in Alaska. Secondly, the TAC shares are divided be-
tween seasons before the individual vessels can compete for their individual shares
of these seasonal group quotas through an Olympic race for fish or through fixed in-
dividual quotas, which were introduced for factory trawlers through a cooperative
system in 1999. In the EU, each country constitutes one TAC region. The TAC for
each EU country is further partly allocated to vessels through Producer Organiza-
tions, or POs (Salz 1992; Hatcher 1997; Young, Smith, and Muir 1996).
In other countries, such as Norway, quotas are allocated to target vessel groups
with similar catch and processing technology; e.g., coastal fleet, purse-seiners, fresh
fish trawlers, factory trawlers, etc. Sometimes regions and vessel groups are com-
bined in one target group.
Regional constraints can also be included in SQAs. The target group may be
geographical regions or groups of vessels, fishers, or processors. For example, cod
vessels with passive gears (longline, net, jigging, etc.) north of 62˚N in northern
Norway are managed as a separate target group for quota allocation and received
69% of the Norwegian Norwegian-Arctic cod quota in 1999 (Fiskets Gang 1999).
Dividing the TAC quotas into SGQs may also satisfy the governments’ alloca-
tion objectives.
Throughout the auction process, management will receive information about tar-
get groups’ willingness to pay for the SQUs in different seasons. This market infor-
mation from the auction, including the fishers’ judgement of the value-adding op-
Table 2
Example of Quota Allocation (1,000 tons) to Season and Vessel Target Groups
Jan. 1 – April 1 – Sept. 1 –
Target Group/ Season Year/SGQ March 31 Aug. 31 Dec. 31
Year/SGQ 400’ 150’ 125’ 125’
Vessel < 10 m from Northern Norway 140’ 50’ 50’ 40’
Longliners 10–30 m 100’ 40’ 30’ 30’
Danish seine vessels 10–30 m 20’ 10’ 5’ 5’
Trawlers 140’ 50’ 40’ 50’Trondsen 30
portunities, may satisfy the need for market information in future design of quota
units and allocation decisions as discussed by Sylvia (1994). Auction statistics will
show the impact of the TAC allocation profile on market prices and resource rent
generation. For example, how does the total sales value of a TAC vary if a certain
share of a TAC is allocated to the winter season compared with the summer and au-
tumn seasons? See examples of such judgements in Martinez-Garmendia, Anderson,
and Carroll (2000). Without such market information, the political allocation pro-
cess will be based on estimates of the relative need for quotas among the different
participants in the fishery based on the relative number of fishers, political influ-
ence, regional impact, etc. Market considerations are seldom a part of the decision
background in, for example, the Norwegian quota allocations. Lack of such market
orientation in fisheries management tends to be a main barrier for value adding in
the fishing industry (Trondsen 1997).
Allocating TAC shares for one year or longer as proposed by Morgan (1995)
and Brubaker (1995), makes it difficult to integrate other measures with the total
quota. Such allocation of yearly TAC shares also allows for, as in ordinary ITQ sys-
tems, short-term seasonal quota trading and redistribution of the resource rent di-
rectly between the fish companies outside the auction when fishing conditions
change. This effect may be avoided if the quota units are related to fishing seasons
and other biological constraints, which fit better into both the fishers’ and managers’
planning horizons and objectives.
Licensing is an established method of discriminating between individuals, and
may be an efficient tool, especially for securing governmental objectives other than
capturing the resource rent.
To get rid of the technical inefficiency problem, where licenses are connected to
specific vessels (as in Norway), the license rights may be separated from the vessels
and allocated to persons or enterprises (as in Iceland). A license is a right based on a
legal contract between the user and the owner (all citizens) represented by the gov-
ernment. The anticipated behavior of the license holder may be regulated in such
contracts regarding limitation of quotas, bycatch, exchanges of quotas with other us-
ers, etc. In order to maintain real bidding competition in the quota auction, the li-
cense system should not limit the number of licenses in each target group. Govern-
ment may, however, impose constraints on licenses, such as ownership of specific
vessels, residence in specific areas, nationality, etc.
All who satisfy a set of generic rules should be given a license, but to get a
quota, the license holder must go to the auction and purchase quota in competition
with other licensed fishers. A license should, therefore, be a right to buy seasonal
quota units in the auction, rather than a right to get a quota allocated.
The Auction
To be efficient, markets need many competing and independent buyers and sellers.
In this case, the government is the only seller. To create a real market situation, the
role of the powerful seller of quota units should not be mixed with the role of the
political allocation institution influenced by interest groups. The separation of the
two roles is secured by auctions of the same type, as the European raw fish auctions
between fishers as sellers and the first buyers (Kearny 1997). Transferred to quota
exchange, this type of seasonal quota auction might be an independent institution
with the sole purpose of managing the exchange process of SQUs between buyers
(licensed fishers) and the seller (the government’s representative). By accepting
only anonymous, simultaneous bidding, the auction exchange process will also
hinder collusion of bidders and tactical sequential bidding (Morgan 1995).Market-oriented Value Adding 31
SQUs may be auctioned separately, where only licensed buyers belonging to the
same group are allowed to bid.
The auction institution, in addition to managing the technical part of the auc-
tion, may also serve as an information database, by supplying various sales reports
and other information for any time period since implementation of the systems.
Experience from Iceland shows that fish auctions technically can be operated as
computerized systems that are based on remote bidding. This will increase the num-
ber of buyers and increase the efficiency of the market (Arnarson and Trondsen
1998).
Compared with established systems, there shouldn’t be any significant increases
in management costs. Each auction can be run by a few people and may be much
more efficient than traditional quota allocations systems, which keeps the Norwe-
gian Directorate of Fisheries busy. Increases in resource rent can be a source of
funding for management and research. For fishers who must continually buy shares,
transactions costs may be somewhat higher compared to administrative allocations
or one-time purchase of an ITQ. Fishers’ success in getting licenses and administra-
tive allocated quotas may, however, rely on heavy involvement in the political and
organizational levels influencing quota allocation. Political allocations also are
risky—they must constantly be defended; whereas the proposed seasonal allocations
allow more long-run certainty about access to fish. Purchase of an ITQ, on the other
hand, would demand much more capital and consequently much higher capital costs.
Technically, the auctions may be open for hundreds or thousands of fishers. The
experience from Iceland shows that computer technology makes this very easy. It is
possible for a fisher to sit in his/her boat and be connected to the auction. For those
who do not have the necessary technical equipment, it is possible to arrange auc-
tions in every landing place along the coast. A great advantage for a quota auction is
that the buyer does not have to see the product he is buying, as farmers do when
they are buying live cattle, or when a fish buyer purchases iced fish at a land-based
fish auction. It means that the auction process can be done entirely by using comput-
ers and the Internet. Quota auctions may also be combined with fresh fish auctions,
where the fishers change roles from buyer to seller and receive market signals from
farther along the value chain.
Based on learning curve theory, we also suggest that the valuable market infor-
mation gathered from the auction over time will improve the knowledge basis and
the communication between regulators and their more business-oriented clients (see
Sylvia 1994).
Costs and Benefits of an SQA
Governmental restrictions may, as shown by Matthiasson (1997), reduce the theo-
retical economic gain from an ITQ system without restrictions. The difference may
be seen as a compensation for the social cost. The resource rent collected by society
through the auction may be a source for financing resource management, research,
and development of more value-adding activities.
Market-orientated innovation may also be motivated and improved through
lower entry barriers than those of the ITQ system. Without links between quota and
vessels, all quota-holding companies may buy and sell vessels without any signifi-
cant interference from the government. The vessel prices will adapt to an interna-
tional price level and will only reflect the present value of the ship as a catching and
processing machine and not the quota values. This will reduce entry costs for young
fishers and thereby motivate entrepreneurship and innovation, which normally fol-Trondsen 32
low newcomers. Allocation of specific quotas to recruit new fishing entrepreneurs,
as practiced in Norway, can also ease entry costs for young fishers.
The purchase prices and capital barriers for seasonal group quotas will be much
lower compared with purchasing permanent quota shares in an ITQ system. Payment
credit until after the fish is sold (similar to pay-as-you-fish royalties), will also favor
entrepreneurs without much capital (Morgan 1995; Brubaker 1995). The system
should also hinder outcomes such as we have seen in Iceland, where freely traded
ITQs tend to be concentrated in the hands of a few specialized quota owners. These
quota barons, as they are called in Iceland, make profits by further renting out the
quotas to the actual fishers (Eythorsson 1996; Arnarson and Trondsen 1998).
SQAs lower mobility barriers between different fisheries and seasons and may
also level out profit differences due to movement of vessels between fisheries. More
flexibility in moving vessels between different fisheries may also reduce the politi-
cal pressure for increased TAC driven by overcapacity. The advantages of an ITQ
system are kept and most disadvantages removed.
GENERAL PROPOSITION V: Fisheries that auction seasonal group quotas may: (i)
secure allocation objectives; and (ii) motivate market-oriented value adding and
cost efficiency in the value chain, by lowering capital requirements and license bar-
riers for entering fishers.
Resource Rent Collection
What about the collected resource rent? Does it go directly to the treasury? This un-
certainty is a major factor explaining the lack of interest in collecting resource rent
from the fisheries. As Cunningham (1993) has observed, fisheries management es-
sentially is a choice about how to spend the resource rent. However, there is also a
relationship between resource rent generation and choice of fisheries management
systems. Norway has a system where all governmental income belongs to the trea-
sury before it can be redistributed. This connection doesn’t give the industry motiva-
tion to promote systems for resource rent collection. A better incentive would be to
allocate part of the resource rents to funds that may be utilized for fisheries manage-
ment, coastal management, research, and development to increase value adding in
the resource-based regions. Such regional funds based on resource rent from natural
resources exist for oil (Alaska) and electricity (Norway) (Amundsen, Andersen, and
Sannarnes 1992). Development of comanagement, where fishing cooperatives man-
age their own allocation tasks under government guidelines as practiced in Japan, is
another possibility (Okada and Yamamoto 1994; Lim, Matsua, and Shigema 1995).
Such comanagement is also practiced in Norway (Lofoten), in the US Pacific whit-
ing fishery, and was introduced in the Alaska pollock fisheries in 1999 by the
American Fisheries Act S 1222. How the user group should be incorporated in the
management process is a question of institutional design (Jentoft 1989; Jentoft and
McCay 1995).
One alternative is that the government allocates quota ownership to regions,
fishing groups, or other entities. These entities may manage auctions as described
above, collect the rental payments, and redistribute the resource rent back to the par-
ticipants as a bonus at the end of the year per ton catch or in collective development
funds.
Competition for resource rent in itself is a driving force in the development of
fishery management systems. Most countries develop management systems step by
step. It is, therefore, interesting to note the political/legal process in Iceland, whichMarket-oriented Value Adding 33
in the late 1980’s introduced a system of limited licenses and the ITQ system. This
change resulted in the development of a small group of private quota owners. In the
fall of 1998, the Icelandic Supreme Court ruled that the system of limited licenses
was unconstitutional. The government, therefore, had to introduce a new license sys-
tem, which was open for all, but kept the ITQ system for all fish stocks where TAC
regulations were in force. This means that the Icelandic system, in fact, has devel-
oped into a system with open-access licenses and SQAs, as proposed in this paper.
The difference from the proposed SQA system is that the private ITQ owners collect
the resource rent in the Icelandic system by auctioning/selling seasonal quotas to li-
censed vessel owners. This means that the resource rent generation effects should be
the same if the private ITQ owners, instead of governments, organized share quota
auctions as proposed in this paper.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed how fisheries management systems motivate mar-
ket-orientated value adding in the fishing industry, which together with cost effi-
ciency constitutes the sources for the resource rent.
We have found that both the Olympic and license systems motivate catch orien-
tation rather than market orientation. Both systems waste potential resource rent by
tying up capital in overcapacity and reducing potential market values from the lim-
ited total quota due to the reduced time available for market orientation.
Introduction of licenses may reduce catching costs in Olympic-style manage-
ment, but may have the opposite effect if activity catch records are required to
qualify and maintain license rights. The activity requirement may also limit the
available time for market-oriented value adding by fishers.
Transferable license and quota systems are the only recognized systems that ef-
fectively create exit strategies in the industry where the participants themselves ad-
just catch and processing costs to the potential income from the available quota.
This allows the cost side of the resource rent to be maximized through many indi-
vidual judgements and decisions. These systems, however, may increase monetary
and legal entry barriers for new entrants into the industry. Those who have control
over the quotas may generate monopoly profit without market-oriented value add-
ing. Under these conditions, new entrepreneurs with new, market-oriented ideas may
be hindered from entering the industry, and the industry may not fully realize the
potential market-oriented values.
We have found that fish auctions are an efficient mechanism to motivate maxi-
mization of values between many buyers with heterogeneous preferences and sellers
of products with heterogeneous attributes. However, the presence of a few, powerful
buyers with vertical control in the value chain may increase entry barriers and re-
duce the extent to which auctions contribute to market orientation.
In this paper, we have introduced the concept of SQAs. These, combined with
an open-license system and quota allocation to target fisher groups, will lower entry
barriers for new entrants, thereby stimulating market orientation and cost efficiency.
SQAs may also make it possible to collect resource rent for redistribution to society
or back to the fishing community.
SQAs differ from ITQs in the sense that permanent quota ownership is not
transferred, but fishers are offered a right to lease a natural resource on a temporary
basis. SQAs offer a management solution to improve market orientation and cost ef-
ficiency without first privatizing the fish resources in a few, private hands, as in the
ITQ system. The potential political attraction for such an idea is derived from theTrondsen 34
potential it creates for coastal and fishing communities to collect and take owner-
ship of the resource rent through comanagement.
SQAs may also be complementary to an ITQ system, if private ITQ owners sell
seasonal quotas to fishers through auctions.
This seasonal fishing allocation model is similar to other leasing arrangements
practiced in recreational fishing. Recreational fishers can get rights to fish for spe-
cific times of year in specific rivers or parts of rivers, while long-term rights are still
held by the landowners. Sometimes we also observe that such seasonal fishing rights
are auctioned among users who are willing to pay the highest price.
Leasing, rather than ownership, is not a new idea in economic theory. Seasonal
quota auctions for commercial fisheries, as suggested in this paper, should be ana-
lyzed further in light of experience from similar management schemes for recre-
ational fishing and other natural resources and in the light of economic leasing
theory.
References
Amundsen, E.S., C. Andersen, and J.G. Sannarnes. 1992. Rent Taxes on Norwegian
Hydropower Generation. Energy Journal 13(1):97–116.
Anderson, J.L. 1995. Purchase Behavior, Food Safety, and Quality Control in Sea-
food and Aquaculture Marketing. American Journal of Agricultural Economics
77(5):1319–21.
Aquilera, F. 1991. The Tragedy of Commons or the Tragedy of Misinterpretation in
Economics. Paper presented at the IASCP Conference, Sept. 26–29, Winnipeg,
Canada.
Arnarson, I., and T. Trondsen. 1989. Fishery in the North Pacific. Report, Forut,
Tromsø, Norway.
_. 1998. Value Adding in the First Hand Sales of Fish. A Comparison Between
Contract- and Auction-Market Prices. A Descriptive Analyses of the Icelandic
Case. Proceedings of the Eight Conference of the International Institute of Fish-
eries Economics and Trade. Tromsø, Norway.
Arnason, R. 1991. Efficient Management of Ocean Fisheries. European Economic
Review 35(2–3):408–17.
Barney, J.B. 1996. Gaining and Sustaining Competitive Advantage. New York:
Addison-Wesley.
Becker, J., and C. Homburg. 1999. Market-Oriented Management: A Systems-Based
Perspective. Journal of Market Focused Management 4:17–41.
Boyd, R.O., and C.M. Dewees. 1991. Putting Theory into Practice: Individual Trans-
ferable Quotas in New Zealand’s Fisheries. Paper presented at IASCP Confer-
ence, Sept. 26–29, Winnipeg, Canada.
Brubaker, H.B. 1995. Auctions in Fisheries. Master Thesis. School of Marine Af-
fairs, University of Washington, Seattle, WA USA.
Butlin, J.A. 1982. Restrictive Licensing as a Tool in Fisheries Management: An
Economist’s Toy, or a Practical Alternative. Policy and Practice in Fisheries
Management. Proceedings of the National Fisheries Seminar on Economic Aspects
of Limited Entry and Associated Fisheries Measures, N.H. Sturgess and T.F.
Meany, eds., pp. 39–56. Canberra, Australia: Department of Primary Industry.
Carroll, M.T., J.L. Anderson, and J. Martinez-Garmendia. 1999. Market Understand-
ing and Opportunities for Market-based Public Management of Natural Re-
sources: US-Japan Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Trade. Rhode Island Agricultural Ex-
periment Station Report Number 3691. University of Rhode Island, Kingston,
RI USA.Market-oriented Value Adding 35
Carpo, C. 2000. Evaluation of Salmon Quality in Prince William Sound During the
1999 Season. Pacific Fisheries Technologists 52nd Annual Meeting, Ketchikan,
AK.
Casey, K.E., C.M. Dewees, B.R. Turries, and J.E. Wilen. 1995. The Effects of Indi-
vidual Vessel Quotas in the British Colombia Halibut Fisheries. Marine Re-
source Economics 10:211–30.
Charles, A.T. 1998a. Living with Uncertainly: Analytical Methods, Management Pri-
orities and the Canadian Groundfish Experience. Fisheries Research 37(1–
3):37–50.
_. 1998b. Fisheries in Transition. Ocean Yearbook 13. The University of Chicago.
Clark, I.N., O.J. Major, and N. Mollett. 1988. Development and Implementation of
New Zealand’s ITQ Management System. Marine Resource Economics
5(4):325–49.
Clark, C.W., and G.R. Munro. 1975. The Economics of Fishing and Modern Capital
Theory: A Simplified Approach. Journal of Environmental Economics and Man-
agement 2:92–106.
Copes, P. 1986a. Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device in Fisheries
Management. Land Economics 62(3):278–91.
_. 1986b. Transferable, Non-transferable and Limited Term Fishing Rights: Fish-
eries Rationalization in a Socioeconomic Context. Discussion paper. Institute of
Fisheries Analyses. Simon Fraser University, Canada.
Cunningham, S. 1993. Fisherman’s Incomes and Fisheries Management. CEMARE
Research Papers No. 61, UK: News Service.
Cyert, R.M., and J.G. March. 1963. The Behavior Theory of the Firm. New Jersey,
USA: Prentice Hall.
Davits, W. 1991. Fisheries Economics is a Special Kind of Economics. LEI, The
Netherlands. Paper presented to the European Association of Fisheries Econo-
mists Conference. Dublin, Ireland, 10–12 April.
Deshpanté, R., J. Farleyand, and F. Webster. 1993. Corporate Culture, Customer Ori-
entation, and Innovativeness in Japanese Firms: A Quadrad Analysis. Journal of
Marketing 57(January):23–37.
DeVoretz, D., and R. Schwindt. 1985. Harvesting Canadian Fish and Rents: A Par-
tial Review of the Report of the Commission on Canadian Pacific Fisheries
Policy. Marine Resource Economics 1(4):347–67.
Dewees, C.M. 1989. Assessment of the Implication of Individual Transferable Quo-
tas in New Zealand’s Inshore Fishery. North American Journal of Fisheries
Management 9:131–39.
Drucker, P.E. 1986. Innovation and Entrepreneurship. Practice and Principles. New
York, USA: Harper Row Publ.
Eythorsson, E. 1996. Theory and Practice of ITQs in Iceland — Privatization of
Common Fishing Rights. Marine Policy 20(3):269–81.
Fiskets Gang. 1999. Fiskeridirektoratet 3:6. Bergen, Norway.
Flaaten, O., K. Heen, and K.G. Salvanes. 1995. The Invisible Resource Rent in Lim-
ited Entry and Quota Managed Fisheries: The Case of Norwegian Purse Seine
Fisheries. Marine Resource Economics 10(4):341–56.
Gordon, H.S. 1954. Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fish-
ery. Journal of Political Economy 62:124–42.
Grafton, R.Q. 1995. Rent Capture in a Rights-based Fishery. Journal of Environ-
mental Management 28(1):48–67.
Gulley, D.A., and S.C. McGill. 1984. Host Government Returns from Natural Re-
source Projects. Journal of World Business. Spring.Trondsen 36
Hanneson, R. 1990. En Samfunnsøkonomisk Lønnsom Fiskerinæringstruktur,
Gevinst, Forvaltning. Rapport til Administrasjons — og arbeidsdepartementet.
Oslo, Norway.
Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162(3859):1243–48.
Hatcher, A.C. 1997. Producers’ Organizations and Devolved Fisheries Management
in the United Kingdom: Collective and Individual Quota Systems. Marine
Policy 21(6):519–33.
Helgason, T. 1991. The Icelandic Quota Management System. A Description and
Evaluation. University of Iceland: Science Institute.
Herrmann, M. 1996. Estimating the Induced Price Increase for Canadian Pacific
Halibut with Introduction of the Individual Vessel Quota Program. Canadian
Journal of Agricultural Economics 44:151–64.
Holm, P., S.A. Rånes, and B. Hersoug. 1998. Political Attributes and Right Based
Management Systems: The Case of Individual Vessel Quotas in the Norwegian
Coastal Cod Fishery. Property Rights and Regulatory Systems in Fisheries, D.
Symes, ed. UK: Fishing News Books.
Jaworski, B.J., and A. Kohli. 1993. Market Orientation: Antecedents and Conse-
quences. Journal of Marketing 57(July):53–70.
Jentoft, S. 1989. Fisheries Co-Management. Delegating Government Responsibility
to Fisher’s Organizations. Marine Policy 13(2):137–54.
Jentoft, S., and B. McCay. 1995. User Participation in Fisheries Management. Les-
sons Drawn from International Experiences. Marine Policy 19(3):227–46.
Kearny. 1997. Management and Feasibility Study on Establishing an Electronic Fish
Auction System. Massachusetts Department of Fish and Wildlife and Environ-
mental Law Enforcement. Boston, MA USA.
Kennedy, J.O.S. 1991. Individual Transferable Quotas. The Australian Experience. Paper
presented to the EAFE Annual Conference. Dublin, Ireland, 10–12 April 1992.
Kohli, A.K., and B.J. Jaworski. 1990. Market Orientation: The Construct, Research
Propositions, and Managerial Implications. Journal of Marketing 54(April):1–18.
Larkin, S., and G. Sylvia. 1995. Product Quality and Fisheries Management: A Bio-
Economic Analysis of the Pacific Whiting Fishery. American Journal of Agri-
cultural Economics 77(5):1375.
_. 1999. Intrinsic Fish Characteristics and Intra-Season Production Efficiency: A
Management-Level Bio-Economic Analysis of a Commercial Fishery. American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 81(1):29–43.
Lim, C.P., Y. Matsua, and Y. Shigema. 1995. Co-management in Marine Fisheries in
Japan. Coastal Management 25(3):195–221.
Lindner, R.K., H.F. Campbell, and G.F. Bevin. 1992. Rent Generation During the
Transition to a Managed Fishery: The Case of the New Zealand ITO System.
Marine Resource Economics 7(4):229–48.
Lipnowski, I.F. 1991. Solving the Tragedy of Commons: An Aternative to
Privatization. Paper presented at the IASCP Conference. Sept. 26–29,Winnipeg,
Canada.
Martinez-Garmendia, J., J.L. Anderson, and M.T. Carroll. 2000. Effect of Exploita-
tion Alternatives on the Quality of US North Atlantic Bluefin Tuna. North
American Journal of Fisheries Management 20(4):908–22.
Matthiasson, T. 1997. Consequences of Local Government Involvement in the Ice-
landic ITQ Market. Marine Resource Economics 12(2):107–26.
McKay, B.J., and C.F. Creed. 1990. Social Structure and Debates in Fishery Man-
agement in the Mid-Atlantic Surf Clam Fishery. Ocean and Shoreline Manage-
ment 13:199–229.
Morgan, G.R. 1995. Optimal Fisheries Quota Allocation Under a Transferable Quota
(TQ) Management System. Marine Policy 19(5):379–90.Market-oriented Value Adding 37
Narver, J.C., and S.F. Slater. 1990. The Effect of Market Orientation on Business
Profitability. Journal of Marketing October:20–35.
Narver, J.C., S.F Slater, and B. Tietje. 1998. Creating a Market Orientation. Journal
of Market Focused Management 2:241–55.
National Research Council. 1999. Sharing the Fish: Toward a National Policy on
Individual Fishing Quotas. Committee to Review Individual Fishing Quota.
United States: National Academy Press.
Neher, P.A., R. Arnason, and M. Molett, eds. 1989. Rights Based Fishing. The Neth-
erlands: Kluwer Academic Press.
Odaka, N., and T. Yamamoto. 1994. Fishery Cooperative Association in Japan and
its Vital Role in Fish Marketing. Proceedings of The Sixth Conference of the In-
ternational Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, M. Antona, J.
Catanzano, and J.G. Sutinen, eds., pp. 1125–29. Issy les Moulineaux, France:
IFREMER Cent., Paris.
Porter, M. 1980. Competitive Strategies. New York, USA: The Free Press.
_. 1981. The Contribution of Industrial Organization to Strategic Management.
Academy of Management Review 6:609–20.
_. 1985. Competitive Advantage. London, UK: The Macmillan Press.
_. 1990. The Competitive Advantages of Nations. London, UK: The Macmillan
Press.
Rogers, E. 1983. Diffusion of Innovations. New York, USA: The Free Press.
Ruekert, R. 1992. Developing a Market Orientation: An Organizational Strategy
Perspective. International Journal of Research in Marketing 9:225–45.
Salz, P. 1992. How Common is the Common Fisheries Policy? EAFE Bulletin 2:3.
Scherer, F.M. 1980. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. Bos-
ton, MA USA: Houghton Mifflin.
Scott, A., and P.A. Neher. 1981. The Public Regulations of Commercial Fisheries in
Canada. Canada: Ministry of Supply and Services.
Simon, H. 1958. Administrative Behavior. New York, USA: The Free Press.
Sissenwine, M.P., and P.M. Mace. 1992. ITQs in New Zealand: The Era of Fixed
Quota in Perpetuity. Fisheries Bulletin 90(1):147–60.
Sjøholt, T. 1997. Innføring Av Et Nytt Reguleringsregime For Kveitefisket I Alaska,
Og Dets Innvirkning I Kveitemarkedet. Masters thesis, Norwegian College of
Fisheries Sciences, University of Tromsø, Norway.
Smith, A. 1993. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Re-
print edition. The World’s Classics Series, K. Sutherland, ed. Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press.
Sylvia, G. 1994. Market Information and Fisheries Management: A Multi-Objective
Analysis. North American Journal of Fisheries Management 14:278–90.
Trondsen,T. 1985. Industriell Innovasjon. En undersøkelse av institusjonelle
forutsetninger. Dr. Scient. Thesis. Institutt for Fiskerifag, University of Tromsø,
Norway.
_. 1994. Price Fluctuation and Substitution in the Groundfish Market. Proceedings
of the Sixth Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics
and Trade, M. Antona, J. Catanzano, and J.G. Sutinen, eds. France: IFREMER.
_. 1997. Value-added Fresh Seafood: Barriers to Growth. Journal of International
Food and Agribusiness Marketing 8(4):55–78.
Trondsen, T., and J. Angel. 1992. Regional Enterprise Share Quota system (RESQ). Pro-
ceedings The European Association for Fishery Economists. Salerno, Italy. May.
Trondsen, T., and R.S. Johnston. 1998. Market Orientation and Raw Material Con-
trol. Journal of Market Focused Management 3(2):193–210.
Young, J.A., A.P Smith, and J.F. Muir. 1996. Representing the Individual Fisher: An
Attitudinal Perspective on One PO’s Membership. Marine Policy 20(2):157–69.